This week’s featured archive: Intentionality III

The Landscape of Being

The existence-independent and concept-dependent character of Intentionality

I have been arguing in this thesis that meaning which accrues to the questioning being constitutes identity. I have argued that one’s identity furthermore is audited as identity-sense against the criterion of one’s desire for significance and capacity for purpose. One might argue that this is problematic because one’s identity is not a thing that exists anywhere. There is no collected store of meaning at any one time that I can access and measure, consequently it is problematic to claim that I can take a relational stance towards this accretion of meaning as if it were a tangible extra-mental object.

My intentionality can be directed towards the content of experience that is not existent somewhere in the world My intentionality can be directed towards the content of experience that is not existent somewhere in the world

It has however been convincingly noted that to imagine Pegasus, the flying horse of Greek mythology, is to construct an imaginative representation ‘of’ Pegasus to…

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